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1. On 24 October the Chilean Congress will choose, by secret ballot, between the two candidates, Allende and Alessandri, who obtained 36.3% and 34.9% respectively of the popular vote. Allende's election ought not to be a sure thing, since there is a legal and constitutional alternative: Alessandri has promised to resign if he is elected, thus making possible a new election in which President Frei could participate and which would provide an alternative to a Marxist government which does not really represent the will of the majority of the Chilean electorate. The solution seemed simple: Frei would deliver his Party's vote to Alessandri, thereby assuring himself and his party another six years in office while saving his country from the agonies of Communist repression.

2. Frei originally encouraged the maneuver to line up PDC votes for Alessandri, whose statement regarding his resignation if elected was coordinated in advance by Frei. But Frei no longer controls his Party's Congressional votes. One reason for this lack of control, in addition to the neglect and indecision of Frei himself, is the animosity of Bernardo Leighton, once a close collaborator of Frei and certainly not a Marxist, who harbors a grudge against Frei for having ignominiously removed him from his post as Minister of Interior two years ago. Allende needs only 21 PDC votes to win, and Leighton, who as PDC Vice President controls at least that number, has warned Frei that he intends to deliver them to Allende. Moreover, the large left-wing faction of the PDC, lead by Radomiro Tomic (the Chilean Turbay) has already declared for Allende. On 23 September a delegation from the PDC met with Allende to present the PDC's list of "guarantees" which, if met, would induce the PDC to cast the votes of all 75 of its parliamentary members for Allende. At the request of the PDC, Allende was unaccompanied. The "guarantees" listed in the attachment, which have been accepted by Allende, were published in the Santiago press on 24 September. The PDC negotiating committee also requested three other guarantees to which Allende agreed on condition that they be kept secret. They are:

Declassified and
Approved for Release
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- a. that General Huerta, Director of the Carabineros and the three commanders of the military services be retained at least until April 1971;
- b. that the PDC be consulted in the appointments of the Ministers of Defense and Interior; and
- c. that the Popular Unity (UP) provide the PDC conditions with legal validity.

Communist leaders are not at all concerned about making guarantees, but they do want as big a margin as possible in the Congressional vote in order to propagandize outside Chile that Allende has the support of the whole country and that there is virtually no opposition to his government which won only 36% of the vote.

3. Meanwhile Allende is already behaving like the President-elect, and in trying to lull widespread fears generated by the Communists immediately after the popular election when, using the tactics employed by the Soviets in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the PCCh moved quickly to gain control of key Chilean media organs. Journalists and newscasters who refused to support Allende were subjected to a barrage of threats of assassination and physical violence, and Communist leaders visited key radio and television stations demanding that station newsrooms be placed under Unidad Popular management. Initial Communist successes, such as the PCCh takeovers of University of Chile TV Channel 9 and Catholic University Channel 13, were widely publicized in the foreign press, so that the Communists are now continuing their campaign in a lower key, organizing "workers' cooperatives" to take over control from within. Attachment 2 provides data on early PCCh moves to control the Chilean media. Allende himself is offering something to everyone, wooing the Alessandristas with promises to use their technical and managerial talents in his new government, and offering security and better pay to the military.

4. Concurrently with Allende's wooing of the regular military, the Communists are moving quietly ahead with their plans to assume early control of the Carabineros and of civilian intelligence services. For example, they have already called on

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[REDACTED] demanding that he accept a "liaison" representative and make available his files, and it is known that Allende plans to increase the Carabineros by 8,000 men of pro-Allende tendency immediately upon his inauguration. The Unidad Popular is also known to have evaluated each military officer in terms of his individual reliability vis-a-vis Allende and to have singled out specific officers for removal or isolation.

5. President Frei has told military leaders that he now considers that parliamentary action to defeat Allende is impossible, blaming his loss of control of the PDC on Radomiro Tomic and Bernardo Leighton, who he says, are determined to reach an agreement with the Unidad Popular. Frei has also hinted that he would like to have the military take some action which would prevent his going down in history as the man who delivered Chile to the Communists. Frei has lamented that Chile will soon become another Cuba. But he has neither taken any action nor requested his military chiefs to do so. He is waiting, willingly, for the military to depose him. However, the constitutionalist-minded Chilean military are waiting for Frei to give them instructions to stage a coup. Thus, they are in a stalemate and it is almost certain, unless Frei demonstrates some unusual leadership which he has not indicated he is capable of to this date, that Allende will be the president of Chile on 4 November. It is also certain, beyond a question of a doubt, that within a few months Chile will have lost its freedom of the press, Congress will be closed, and the Communists (who provided 80% of the electoral organization for Allende) will be running Chile. The implications for Chile, for the Andean common market, and for Latin America are clear. The terrorist intellectual leader, Senator Carlos Altamirano, for example, has already issued instructions to his MIR activists (the MOIR and MOEC of Chile) to prepare to move to other countries in Latin America because their job is done in Chile.

6. Not having had the foresight and courage of [REDACTED] Frei did not appoint military chiefs willing and able to protect Chile from the Communists. He now states that a parliamentary solution is impossible and that only the military can save

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the country, but he does not have the courage to arrange the military coup which is apparently the only solution.

In behalf of freedom, of Chile, and of Latin America, it is essential that Frei be encouraged to show some resolution and arrange a military coup himself.

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ATTACHMENT I

A. Preservation of political pluralism and constitutional guarantees: this "requires" continuation of system enabling all currents of opinion to organize and express themselves freely; full constitutional liberties and rights for all; and periodic renewal of authorities via free, secret and informed popular vote. "We are interested in" full recognition of political parties and free and equal access of all currents of opinion to media outlets be they private or state controlled; respect of right of universities, political parties, and other institutions (corporaciones) to maintain media outlets under legal framework which guarantees their inextinguishability; and the preservation of fullest freedom of press and expression, to which end we are opposed to "massive cooperativization of newspapers and radio stations."

B. Rule of Law: This requires continued independence and separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers stipulated by constitution, "without intervention of other de facto organs which might act in name of a supposed popular power."

C. Armed Forces and Carabineros to continue guaranteeing democratic co-existence: This requires "respect for organizational and hierarchical structures;" systems of selection; requirements and disciplinary standards now in effect; equipment adequate for carrying out traditional role of safeguarding national security; the integrity of their budgets; and the preclusion of parallel armed organizations.

D. Education free from official ideological influence, and university autonomy. This requires preservation of current pluralistic educational system including guarantee of existence, operation and financing of private non-profit education and preparation and selection of school texts by educators of diverse ideologies. University autonomy, maintenance and adequate financing of private universities, and non-political criteria for university entrance and for academic recruitment and promotion should be established in constitution.

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E. Free labor and social organizations: Requires widest possible respect for trade unions, cooperatives, juntas de vecinos, centros de madres, and other community organizations, including the rights of strike and petition.

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ATTACHMENT II

Following is additional data on PCCh maneuvers to control Chilean mass communications media.

During 15-17 September the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] successful maneuvers to bring Chilean mass communications media under UP control.

In key radio/TV medium, PCCh gave orders to PCCh controlled state technical university (UTE) which is financed by the Chilean Government to drop all pretenses of being cultural and educational station and to concentrate on propagation UP and PCCh news and political commentaries. Communist student and channel workers have taken over full editorial control of Catholic University Channel 9 which is broadcasting news commentary and political interviews of apparent Communist rather than socialist or UP origin. The Government and the PDC have made a semi-official disclosure of the UTE and Channel 7 takeovers by PCCh through presidential palace paid journalist and TV newscaster Luis Hernandez Parker. In a lead article published by the PDC oriented weekly news magazine, "Ercilla" on talks between PDC Commission and UP re guarantees for future Democratic Government under Allende, presidential news leader Hernandez Parker wrote: "La comision que converse con Allende le lleve una carpeta con documentos que, a su juicio, demuestran esta actitud permanente del PC. Segun La Comision de la DC la politica comunista en la UTE, en el canal 9 de TV; su iniciativa para que fueran aceptados voceros suyos en la TV nacional un en las principales emisoras, no son los unicos ejemplos. Por los demas, agrega la DC, tales impetus no son originales de la PC Chileno. Forman parte de se estrategia y de su experiencia historica en Europa, Asia y America Latina" Note charges leaked through Hernandez Parker are directed at PCCh alone and not at PS or UP as a whole.

PCCh/UP pressures on radio stations to hire UP pressroom personnel and announcers and to give UP personnel key news

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commentary space have resulted in a number of surrenders by frightened station managements. At the same time these stations have been forced to dismiss veteran staffers both to make room for UP incumbents and cover increasing losses in advertising revenue. GOC/PDC has taken note this situation in government daily, "La Nacion," 15 September article headline, "Periodistas Denuncian Persucucion En Radios." The article replays a complaint by national trade union of radio newsmen (Sindicato de Periodistas Radiales) against increasing censorship of information being imposed on various radio stations in Santiago. It also denounces the campaign of terror and pressure against radio newsmen which includes arbitrary dismissals despite national law forbidding dismissals of newsmen during election period.

The PCCh is still not attempting to cow independent small provincial newspapers, but has struck at "Sopesur" chain of papers in major southern cities. In last-ditch attempt to keep provincial chain out of PCCh hands, Sopesur directors and main stockholders are reliably reported to be negotiating a sale of controlling shares to a PDC front group. In the meantime, an editor of one of the leading Sopesur papers reports that unless PDC moves rapidly the following Sopesur papers will have to stop presses: "Diario Austral" in Temuco, "Correo de Valdivia," "La Prensa de Osorno," "La Prensa" of Concepcion and the conservative daily, "Diario Ilustrado" in Santiago. Should the Sopesur Southern Press Chain and "El Mercurio" northern chain either stop presses or come under PCCh control, this will mean end of significant free press in Chilean provinces and force rural population to turn for information to national chain and provincial radio stations which, as previously reported, are falling under PCCh and UP control.

"El Mercurio" of Santiago persists in daily editorial attacks on UP. Blue collar workers union at Mercurio still claims it will physically eject any strangers hired at Mercurio under UP pressures, but the majority of Mercurio staff is losing courage in spite of rumors reporting imminent departure for Brazil, Argentina and U.S. of leading managerial personnel at Mercurio. These rumors being generated by [REDACTED] Mercurio staffer who is one of heads of new "United Front" movement.

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Just prior to elections, MAPU- and PCCh-directed student leaders and teachers in Catholic University Journalism School forced ejection of all professors and assistants associated with non-leftist newspapers. PCCh and MAPU have now rammed through new university law reorganizing structure of journalism school and in process are relieving all non-UP personnel of their jobs through legal action. University of Chile Journalism School, already under UP control, has already excluded non-Marxists from school administrative and teaching positions.

In its eagerness to pressure PDC Congressmen to vote for Allende with minimum guarantees, the PCCh has surfaced one of its top assets, PDC Deputy Luis Maira.

[REDACTED] Writing under his well known pseudonym, "Castor" in the 17 September issue of the violently anti-rightist tabloid, "Clarín," "Fifth Columnist" Maira published an involved and emotional appeal to his fellow PDC Congressmen to forget about seeking guarantees from the UP in return for voting for Allende in the run-off election. "What can be gained with 20 pages or more of guarantees to preserve Chilean democracy?" He insists that the PDC's primary task is to prevent the election of Alessandri and strive to guarantee democracy through PDC strength in the coalition government with the UP after the election.